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MANNED-UNMANNED TEAMING: TRAINING US ARMY UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM
OPERATORS IN THE SCOUT-RECONNAISSANCE ROLE
John E. Stewart
US Army Research Institute
Fort Rucker, AL
Until recently, U.S. Army unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) were intelligence-gathering
platforms. The UAS mission has recently changed from strategic intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) to scout-reconnaissance (SR) operations. This shift has produced an
increased requirement for coordination between manned and unmanned aircraft. Mannedunmanned teaming (MUM-T) requires that UAS operators become knowledgeable and proficient
in the same scout-reconnaissance (SR) skills as pilots of armed helicopters. This paper
summarizes the many training challenges consequent to the move from ISR to SR roles. It will
review completed and ongoing research efforts by the Army Research Institute (ARI) Fort Rucker
element, which investigated (a) preparedness of UAS operators to perform tactical SR missions,
(b) the training provided at a Combat Training Center (c) differential perspectives of the manned
and unmanned Army aviation communities on the role of UAS in MUM-T, (d) MUM-T skills
that must be trained and measured.
Background
Shadow (RQ-7B) is a medium unmanned aircraft system (UAS) and currently the most
numerous in the US Army inventory. Other medium to heavy Army UAS are also employed as scoutreconnaissance (SR) assets. These are the MQ-1C Gray Eagle and the MQ-5B Hunter. The Army UAS
mission until recently was intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) in which UAS operators
proceeded to a predetermined location, collected data, and stayed within the assigned grid until instructed
to proceed to another location. Real-time video feed was provided to the Brigade Tactical Operations
Center where image analysis was performed. The new SR role is quite different. The tasks include zone
and route reconnaissance, in which the RQ-7B flies in increasing, concentric circles to assure that the area
is free of potential threats, as well as laser designation and handover of targets to armed helicopters.
Although route and zone reconnaissance superficially resemble ISR tasks, they are very different. UAS
operators must understand, interpret and develop the tactical situation. Developing the situation entails
communicating and coordinating with ground forces and/or other aircraft, attribution of target intent, and
determining impact of the situation on friendly forces. These SR skills are traditionally performed by
crews of scout helicopters, such as the OH-58D.
Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T)
One advantage of training UAS operators in the SR role is better coverage of the battlespace by
combining the complementary strengths of armed helicopters and UAS. The OH-58D and AH-64D can
find, designate and destroy targets under day or night conditions, but have limited endurance and typically
operate at low altitudes. The RQ-7B, also equipped with a sensor suite (mission payload) can remain
airborne for over 6 hours and operate above 6,000 feet, giving it a different vantage point to detect and
identify targets, and report changes in the tactical situation to the armed helicopter. The helicopter can
attack the target from a more covert location, sometimes without seeing it. MUM-T missions, a result of
the shift from ISR to SR, will impact training requirements for the UAS air vehicle and mission payload
operators. This paper reviews recent Army Research Institute (ARI) efforts to understand the training
implications of these changes.
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Current Status of UAS Operator Training
Proficiency of New UAS Operators Reporting to the Unit
ARI asked the principal staff officers (Majors and Lieutenant Colonels) at three selected Brigade
Combat Teams (BCT), the extent to which new UAS operators reporting to the BCT were able to perform
critical SR tasks (Stewart, Bink, Barker, Tremlett, & Price, 2011). The staff officers interviewed
comprised Intelligence (S2), Operations (S3), and Brigade Aviation officers (BAO), as well as senior
leaders and trainers of two UAS Platoons (each BCT has one MI Company, which includes a UAS
Platoon). Of the three staff officers, only the BAO is an aviator. The S2 and S3 are ground officers, who
plan the RQ-7B missions. Interviews revealed that the perspective of the S2 tended to be military
intelligence (MI) in terms of UAS employment, in which the mission was ISR. Neither the S2 nor the S3
showed extensive knowledge of how to employ UAS as an SR asset, though they agreed that new UAS
operators required additional training at the BCT before they could execute SR missions. BAOs and
senior UAS Platoon members had greater knowledge of aviation tactical operations and generally
believed that UAS operators lacked the necessary SR skills when reporting to the BCT.
Thus the consensus of respondents was that RQ-7B operators arrive at the unit poorly trained for
tactical SR mission execution, except for Airspace Operations, which are well-trained institutionally at
Fort Huachuca, AZ. The ARI research team also learned that opportunities for unit level training and
practice of SR skills while the BCT is at home station are limited due to multiple factors, including
airspace restrictions on pilotless aircraft, cost, equipment availability, and inadequate range areas.
Respondents added that Combat Training Centers (CTC) provided the only chance for unit-level
collective training and practice while still in the United States. Because of limited training opportunities
at home station, the most effective SR training must take place on the job while the BCT is deployed.
UAS Operator Collective (Unit Level) Training at a Combat Training Center
The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Ft Polk, LA, is a CTC where operational units
perform live training exercises, facing a skilled role-playing opposing force. JRTC has dedicated senior
leaders and Trainer-Mentors (TM) who provide training and feedback to unit leaders and personnel. The
ARI research team interviewed TMs at Brigade, Battalion, and Company levels (Stewart, Barker, & Bink,
2010). One most important finding was that UAS operators at JRTC were not evaluated on criteria
relevant to performance of the SR mission. Instead, UAS teams were evaluated on launch, operation, and
recovery of the aircraft, as well as total hours flown, and often had no clear indication of task and purpose
of the mission, (e.g., check on the status of the troops). TMs noted that staff officers at Battalion and
Brigade level did not seem to have a strong background in UAS operations. There were indications of the
survival of MI culture: the UAS mission plan was still called the (data) collection plan. The S2,
sometimes assisted by the S3, usually took the lead in planning the mission. Trainers and leaders at JRTC
remarked that the leadership of the BCTs often required coaching in how to employ the RQ-7B as a
mission asset, and recommended that education in UAS utilization be elevated all the way to command
level.
Roles and Critical Skills Required of UAS Aircrews for MUM-T
Perceived Roles and Status of UAS and Manned Aviation in MUM-T
Stewart, Roberts, and Bink (2012) conducted a survey of 34 US Army helicopter pilots and 31
Army UAS operators. The questionnaire consisted of two parts: (a) present and future effectiveness of
UAS in the SR role, (b) which of eight selected SR mission tasks were most appropriately performed by
manned aircraft, UAS alone, or UAS and manned aircraft (MUM-T). UAS and manned respondents
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agreed that the role of UAS in the SR operations would expand. UAS personnel indicated that UAS
would eventually perform many if not all of the SR mission tasks currently performed by armed scout
helicopters. By contrast, helicopter pilots indicated that the role of UAS would be to assist, not supplant,
armed helicopters in the SR role, (see Table 1).
Table 1.
Perceptions of Future Roles of Manned and Unmanned Aircraft
Item

Subgroup

UAS will assume a more active role in SR mission.
UAS operators will have to learn to develop the situation
once the target is identified.
UAS will eventually become an equal status player in SR
operations.
UAS has made significant contributions to manned
helicopter SR operations.
In the future, UAS will completely take over the SR role in
tactical operations
UAS operators must assume a more active role in SR than
merely providing an airborne sensor.
Replacement of the OH-58D and AH-64D by weaponized
UAS is unrealistic notion.

Manned
Unmanned
Manned
Unmanned
Manned
Unmanned
Manned
Unmanned
Manned
Unmanned
Manned
Unmanned
Manned
Unmanned

%Agree

97
90
94
83
29
77
88
74
6
52
77
97
76
27

% Disagree

3
10
6
17
71
23
12
26
94
48
23
3
24
73

UAS operators, presented with a list of eight SR mission tasks, indicated that UAS could perform
most of these tasks. Pilots saw most tasks as appropriate to manned aircraft. Even with these differences
in perceptions of UAS roles, it still appeared that most of the eight mission tasks presented were
appropriate to combined manned and unmanned operations. Thus the majority of respondents saw each of
the eight SR mission tasks as appropriate to both manned aircraft and UAS, though patterns of responses
tended to differ for these two groups (Table 2).
Table 2.
Perceived Appropriateness of Selected Mission Tasks for Manned-Unmanned Team Operations
Mission tasks UAS Respondents considered appropriate for both manned
aircraft and UAS.

Actions on Contact
Downed Aircraft Recovery
Fundamentals of Security
Mission tasks Manned Respondents considered appropriate for both
Aerial Observation
manned aircraft and UAS.
Fundamentals of Reconnaissance
Mission tasks both UAS and Manned Respondents considered appropriate
Laser Target Handoff to Ground
for both manned aircraft and UAS.
Target Handover
SALT-W *Reports
Note: Size, Activity, Location, Time, What (procedure for reporting targets/activities observed).

The final pattern of responses showed both manned and unmanned respondents likely to
indicate three mission tasks as appropriate for both UAS and manned aircraft. The tasks that represent
this pattern of responses were Laser Target Handoff to Ground, SALT-W Reports, and Target
Handover. Of all eight tasks, the outlier seems to be Actions on Contact, which 62% of manned
respondents perceived as appropriate primarily to manned aircraft. Similarly, though 88% of manned
respondents saw Aerial Observation as a mission task for both UAS and manned aircraft, unmanned
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respondents were split evenly with 48% stating it was primarily a UAS mission, and 48%, a mission for
both aircraft types.
These findings provide important feedback to decision makers regarding the perceived present
and future tactical roles of manned and unmanned aircraft. Knowing the current attitudes toward
capabilities of UAS could provide insight for training developers who must devise strategies for training
manned and unmanned aircrews to work together as players in MUM-T. The findings also point to the
need to specify more precisely the respective roles of manned and unmanned team members before UAS
can fully participate in MUM-T.
Identifying and prioritizing critical MUM-T skills
Sticha, Howse, Stewart, Conzelman, and Thibodeaux (2012), used a method similar to the Air
Force Mission Essential Competencies (MEC) approach (Colegrove & Bennett, 2006) to identify and
prioritize the most critical individual skills supporting MUM-T, and to pinpoint performance indicators
for these skills. The investigators began with a review of Army doctrinal materials to identify (a) missions
in which UAS operators would need to coordinate with helicopter pilots, (b) specific tasks required to
perform these missions, and (c) MUM-T skills involved in executing these tasks. Training-critical skills
were defined by two criteria: (a) inadequate performance would lead to mission failure or serious risk to
personnel and/or equipment, (b) UAS operators recently graduated from training do not possess these
skills.
Three workshops were conducted with small groups of doctrine developers, scout-attack
helicopter pilots, and UAS senior instructor-operators to determine the relative importance of the skills as
to training criticality, and to derive behavioral indicators of performance. The list of 25 skills was
confirmed as relevant to MUM-T and doctrinally correct in a focus group attended by UAS operators,
scout-attack helicopter pilots, and doctrine developers. Ratings and rank-orderings by participants
indicated that all 25 skills were at least moderately important to SR missions, and present serious risks if
performed incorrectly. Perceived levels of competency of UAS operators to perform the skills varied
greatly, indicating that many were not addressed in training. Some skills, though highly important, were
not rated as training-critical because they were adequately trained. Table 3 presents the 10 most trainingcritical skills.
Table 3.
Rank Ordering of Ten Most Training-Critical MUM-T Skills
Rank

Skill
1 Deconflict munition trajectories from airframe.
2 Utilize standard execution commands to initiate attack.
3 Transmit information on method of attack.
4 Switch roles of laser designator.
5 Conduct call for direct fires.
6 Select best weapon system.
7 Develop/send common operating picture information.
8 Utilize joint, Army, & civilian personnel recovery terminology.
9 Prioritize engagement of targets.

10 Gain and maintain enemy contact.
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The final list of MUM-T skills was reduced to 20 (some were redundant with others, or judged as
holdovers from ISR). For these, 140 performance indicators were derived. These skills and indicators
support the development of two ongoing ARI efforts: a PC-based training tool for practicing the identified
cognitive and procedural skills in the unit, and benchmarked performance measures, designed for use in
networked, virtual environments, as well as live field exercises, where much of MUM-T training will take
place. Table 4 presents an example of behavioral indicators for the skill ranked most important of all 20
remaining skills.
Table 4.
Performance Indicators for Skill: Deconflict Munition Trajectories from Airframe
Call for fire is complete and accurate.
Operator is aware that deconfliction of airspace is taking place.
Operator is aware of positions of friendly assets (e.g., aircraft and ground units).
Operator confirms when (friendly aircraft and/or ground assets) clear.
Operator determines if rounds are accurately placed on target.
Discussion
It is evident that much needs to be done in the development of SR training for the Army UAS
operator. Most tasks that operators will be called on to perform in the operational unit are not those
acquired institutionally during advanced individual training. These are tactical skills, supporting unit-level
mission tasks that typify Army scout-attack and reconnaissance operations. Most SR training for UAS
operators must take place in the operational unit at home station, or during deployment. Most collective
MUM-T training at home station will of necessity have to take place in networked, shared virtual
environments. In addition to knowing what skills are most critical, it will also be necessary to develop
behaviorally-anchored performance measures for each skill. This will assist trainers and Company
commanders in assessing efficiency and effectiveness of collective MUM-T training. Individual training
of cognitive and procedural skills not requiring simulators can be executed on new-generation portable
training devices, such as Tablet PCs. The technology of handheld devices is evolving rapidly; hence, it is
likely that training apps allowing for wireless networking will allow some degree of team-level practice
on these devices at home station.
These technologies for implementation exist at present, but the real challenge to implementation
may be due to differences in organizational culture. Army Pilots and UAS operators come from quite
different backgrounds in terms of formal education, training, required aptitudes and rank. UAS operators
are enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers. Pilots are either commissioned or warrant officers.
Our research efforts have shown that perceptions by members of these two groups of the relative roles
and capabilities of UAS and manned aviation differ in many ways. Senior UAS instructor-operators
generally believed that UAS air vehicle and mission payload operators could acquire the critical skills
necessary to execute most if not all of the SR tasks that armed helicopter crews can perform. By contrast,
most manned helicopter pilots perceived UAS as helping the “shooter” find and attack targets. This is an
important role, but nonetheless subordinate to manned aviation. Among the open-ended statements by
senior members of the UAS community was that UAS can successfully assume the tactical role, if the
manned community would allow it to do so. Looking at the present state of UAS operator training, it is
apparent that newly-trained UAS operators cannot perform the most critical of the SR skills called for by
the MUM-T mission, for the simple reason that these are not trained as part of their common core and
aircraft qualification training. The explanation of this is two-fold: (a) institutional (i.e., schoolhouse)
training time is limited, and there is little opportunity to learn SR skills during primary and advanced
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individual training, and (b) a vestige of MI climate is still evident at the institutional phase of training.
Stewart, et al. (2011) found that unit leaders and trainers believed that more training in SR fundamentals
could take place at the institution. In short, more institutional training in the foundations of SR would
enhance preparation of UAS operators for training in the unit, but more opportunities for home station
training would also have to be provided at the unit. The training institution at Fort Huachuca is striving to
revise its curriculum to include more material pertinent to SR operations, using multimedia approaches
tailored to the cognitive processes of student operators. Stewart, Roberts, and Bink (2012) have suggested
that UAS aircrews spend part of their training time at the Army Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, AL,
planning and rehearsing simulated missions alongside instructors and students from the scout-attack
helicopter community. This would also serve another purpose of integrating UAS into aviation training.
The formation of UAS-manned aviation teams is being facilitated by the stand-up of the Full Spectrum
Combat Aviation Brigade (FSCAB), starting with the 101st at Fort Campbell, KY. The 101st has one
Battalion of OH-58D and RQ-7B aircraft, whose mission is to execute cooperative engagements as
manned-unmanned teams. By requiring UAS and manned helicopter crews to interact during the mission
planning and execution processes, this will likely be the initial step in successfully assimilating UAS into
the world of tactical Army Aviation.
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